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The Importance of Shareholder Activism: The Case of Say-on-Pay 
ABSTRACT 
Manuscript Type: Review 
Research Question/Issue: This study focuses on the role of Say-on-Pay as a mechanism that 
aims to promote the efficiency of corporate governance by providing an additional channel 
for the expression of shareholder “voice”. Initially introduced in the UK, Say-on-Pay has 
subsequently been adopted in a large number of countries and it has recently received 
significant attention from regulators, media and the general public. The purpose of this study 
is to review prior literature related to Say-on-Pay and its impact on firm value and corporate 
decision-making.  
Research Findings/Insights: Our study highlights the interdisciplinary nature of research on 
Say-on-Pay. We also shed light on conceptual gaps and empirical discrepancies in prior 
studies, indicating that many questions linked to Say-on-Pay and its importance for the 
executive pay-setting process remain largely unanswered.  
Theoretical/Academic Implications: At a theoretical level, we highlight potential areas for 
development of the existing theoretical framework for Say-on-Pay, which is at present rather 
limited and primarily influenced by agency theory. At an empirical level, we propose a 
substantial number of avenues for fruitful future research on this topic.  
Practitioner/Policy Implications: In the light of recent proposals for extending the role of 
Say-on-Pay within the corporate governance framework, our findings are particularly 
relevant to regulators. More thought is needed about changing its nature from advisory to 
mandatory, since the degree of its effectiveness and the dynamics of the voting process are 
still unclear. Our study could also be informative for the media and the general public, 
especially given the increasing attention afforded to Say-on-Pay.  
Keywords: Corporate Governance; Say-on-Pay; Shareholder Activism; Shareholder Voting.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Shareholder activism has played a key role in changing corporate decision-making over the 
last years (Goranova & Ryan, 2014; Smith, 1996). The increased shareholder scrutiny of 
corporate practices has been significant and is evident in a number of countries. As a result, 
media organizations talk about a “shareholder spring” (Burgess & McCrum, 2012). 
Shareholder concerns regarding corporate policies are predominantly focused on the 
efficiency of corporate governance practices within a firm (Gillan & Starks, 2000). In 
particular, proposals by boards of directors regarding executive pay arrangements have 
attracted shareholder voting revolts on a number of occasions (Ertimur, Ferri, & Muslu, 
2011; Thomas & Martin, 1999). 
 
Our focus in this paper is on shareholder voting on executive pay and, more precisely, on a 
corporate governance mechanism commonly known as Say-on-Pay. Say-on-Pay was initially 
introduced in the UK in 2002 and mandates an advisory shareholder vote on executive 
remuneration proposed by the board of directors. A number of countries have followed the 
UK with the introduction of similar legislation, including the US, Australia, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Switzerland and Sweden. The purpose of this mechanism is to promote transparency 
by providing a new means of expression of shareholder voice, and hence to improve 
corporate governance efficiency (Conyon & Sadler, 2010). This study discusses and critically 
evaluates existing research on Say-on-Pay and also provides suggestions for future research.  
 
We find that research so far focuses on what we call the “intended” consequences of Say-on-
Pay and follows two main paths. First, a number of studies examine the market reaction to 
the introduction of Say-on-Pay across different countries. We find evidence that the direction 
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and degree of this reaction varies under different settings, a result which raises doubts about 
shareholders’ perceptions regarding the effectiveness of Say-on-Pay. Second, several papers 
focus on the impact of Say-on-Pay-related voting outcomes on executive pay arrangements 
and firm decision-making in general. Our review indicates that prior research fails to provide 
conclusive evidence that there is a strong impact of shareholder dissatisfaction, manifested by 
high voting dissent, on firm policies. We argue that these conflicting results can be mainly 
attributed to research design issues that invoke bias in the relevant findings. In particular, the 
majority of these studies fail to incorporate in their analysis the dynamic nature of 
shareholder voting and the potential drivers or forces of resistance to Say-on-Pay and to 
corporate governance changes in general. Moreover, in many cases, we cannot exclude the 
possibility of confounding effects as well as selection bias issues driving the observed 
outcomes.  
 
This study makes a number of contributions to the corporate governance literature. First, to 
our knowledge, this is the first systematic review of research on Say-on-Pay, which now 
forms a growing part of the wider shareholder activism literature. We highlight the increased 
research focus on shareholder empowerment and its impact on firm decision-making 
processes. Second, our analysis shows that the existing research on Say-on-Pay is rather one-
dimensional and narrow, focused toward the intended consequences of Say-on-Pay on firm 
outcomes. We make a number of suggestions as to how this stream of research can be further 
extended by incorporating the role of key players, such as proxy advisors, in the Say-on-Pay 
voting process and also by taking into account the incentives of different firm stakeholders in 
relation to Say-on-Pay. Moreover, we highlight that the “unintended” consequences of Say-
on-Pay largely remain unexplored and hence can be another interesting avenue for research. 
For example, the implications of Say-on-Pay for the managerial labor market and for agency 
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costs of debt are unresolved issues that could enhance our understanding of this key corporate 
governance mechanism. 
 
Third, an important contribution of this review is that we show there is scope for further 
multidisciplinary research related to Say-on-Pay that incorporates diverse research 
backgrounds and combines different research techniques. In the same spirit, we also highlight 
the transnational aspect of the subject and advocate international comparative research. We 
show that the extant literature is largely focused on the Anglo-Saxon environment; however, 
recent developments have opened fruitful directions for research incorporating a range of 
settings. 
 
Overall, our review contributes to the ongoing debate on the usefulness of Say-on-Pay for 
corporate governance. Since its introduction, Say-on-Pay’s effectiveness in promoting 
shareholder engagement has attracted much attention from academics, the media and the 
general public in several countries. This has become more evident following recently 
introduced or proposed legislation in the UK and across the European Union that aims to 
further promote Say-on-Pay for firm governance (Department for Business Innovation & 
Skills, 2013; European Commission, 2012, 2014). The recent implementation of Say-on-Pay 
provisions within the Dodd Frank Act has also intensified the debate in the US. Our analysis 
is thus relevant to a number of countries and could prove helpful for regulators and 
academics alike.  
 
We present our findings in the following format: Initially, we provide a general overview of 
the shareholder activism literature and the positioning of Say-on-Pay studies in this literature. 
In the following section, we discuss the prevalent theoretical framework for Say-on-Pay. We 
6 
 
then review empirical studies on the market reaction to the introduction on Say-on-Pay and 
the impact of this mechanism on firm outcomes. Subsequently, we provide suggestions for 
future research. We discuss the implications of our findings and draw conclusions in the final 
section.  
 
BACKGROUND 
Shareholder Activism 
 
The importance of shareholder activism for corporate outcomes has attracted great attention 
from both the public and academia. A large number of studies have examined the factors 
leading to shareholder activism-related events, the different forms such activism can take and 
its impact on firm practices. We provide a brief overview of these studies and demonstrate 
how Say-on-Pay studies are positioned within the broad shareholder activism literature, of 
which Goranova and Ryan (2014) provide a detailed multidisciplinary review.  
 
Firm size and performance are among the most important firm-related determinants of 
shareholder initiatives linked with activism (Cai & Walkling, 2011; Cziraki, Renneboog, & 
Szilagyi, 2010; Karpoff, Malatesta, & Walkling, 1996; Smith, 1996). Large firms are the 
focus of attention for activist shareholders, partly because they are more likely to attract 
attention and hence shareholders can expect to have greater public support for their proposals 
(Rehbein, Waddock, & Graves, 2004; Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). Large firms are also 
more subject to corporate governance issues, which means that activism can create more 
value for the shareholders (Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999; John & Klein, 1995). The fact that 
firms with poor operating or market performance are also more likely to be the focus of 
shareholder activists (Bradley, Brav, Goldstein, & Jiang, 2010; Cziraki et al., 2010; Ertimur 
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et al., 2011) highlights the role shareholder activism plays in monitoring the managers of 
underperforming firms. In addition, recent studies emphasize the importance of stock 
liquidity for shareholder activism (Edmans, Fang, & Zur, 2013; Norli, Ostergaard, & 
Schindele, 2015). Increased stock liquidity can facilitate the creation of blockholders and 
hence empower shareholders wishing to engage in activism. It is clear in the extant literature 
that the focus of shareholder activists is primarily directed toward ineffective corporate 
governance mechanisms as well as suboptimal executive pay arrangements (Davis & 
Thompson, 1994; Ferri & Sandino, 2009; Gillan & Starks, 2000). 
 
Prior academic research identifies two main avenues for shareholder intervention in firm 
governance. The first channel (“exit”) is linked with the threat of selling company shares, a 
decision which would impact negatively on the firm’s stock price; this price drop will have 
direct wealth implications for the managers (related to equity-based compensation) as well as 
indirect ones (related to reputation) (Admati & Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans, 2009). Exit threat 
hence gives managers the incentive to act in the interests of the firm and take decisions that 
will not destroy firm value (Edmans, 2009). Shareholders can also “vote with their feet” by 
selling all or part of their stake in the firm as a signal of dissatisfaction towards the 
management team (Bhide, 1993; Parrino, Sias, & Starks, 2003; Roe, 1990). This form of 
activism decreases agency costs and can work in combination with other forms of 
shareholder intervention (Admati & Pfleiderer, 2009).  
 
The second channel of activism (“voice”) is expressed by taking direct action and getting 
involved in firm decision-making. Shareholders can vote against the management or specific 
directors of the firm or become advocates of “just vote no” campaigns (Ashraf, Jayaraman, & 
Ryan, 2012; Conyon & Sadler, 2010; Davis & Kim, 2007; Del Guercio, Seery, & Woidtke, 
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2008). Moreover, blockholders (i.e. investors with over 5% ownership) can submit a 13D 
filing, demonstrating their intention to actively engage with the firm (Edmans et al., 2013; 
Klein & Zur, 2011). Shareholders can also initiate public campaigns and publicize letters 
directed to the management of the firm (Chowdhury & Wang, 2009; Hillman, Shropshire, 
Certo, Dalton, & Dalton, 2011). In such cases, shareholders bear the costs of monitoring the 
management of the firm by providing guidance or intervening in order to increase firm value 
or protect the firm from loss-making decisions. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) highlight the 
threat of the free-rider problem in such cases, whereby a shareholder bears all the monitoring 
costs but only a fraction of the perceived benefits. Evidently, the introduction of Say-on-Pay 
should be considered as an additional channel for shareholder voice and the expression of 
dissatisfaction with corporate decision-making.  
 
The impact of shareholder activism on firm outcomes has been widely studied in the relevant 
literature. A large number of papers examine the market reaction to different types of 
shareholder activism-related events and activist shareholders; overall, the findings in these 
studies are mixed (Agrawal, 2012; Cuñat, Gine, & Guadalupe, 2012; Del Guercio & 
Hawkins, 1999; Klein & Zur, 2011). Factors such as activist shareholder type, the objectives 
of the intervention and firm characteristics (e.g. level of institutional ownership) can impact 
on the direction and size of the market reaction. Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) point out 
the difficulty of identifying the exact announcement dates of shareholder proposals; this 
poses an additional challenge to the researcher in terms of identifying the impact of activism 
on firm value, since most studies of this type follow an event study methodology.  
 
Apart from market-related effects, studies have also focused on the impact of shareholder 
activism on firm performance, where again the findings are equivocal and primarily 
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conditional upon the success of activism in addressing corporate governance issues within the 
firm (Del Guercio et al., 2008; Karpoff et al., 1996; Prevost & Rao, 2000). Studies have also 
examined the impact of shareholder activism on various firm outcomes and the firm’s 
decision-making process. For example, David, Hitt, and Gimeno (2001) show that 
shareholder activism leads to an increase in R&D investment, both in the short and long term. 
Shareholder activism can also have a positive impact on corporate environmental (Clark & 
Crawford, 2012) and social (David, Bloom, & Hillman, 2007; Guay, Doh, & Sinclair, 2004) 
performance. Overall, shareholder activism appears to act as an effective monitoring 
mechanism that can improve corporate governance efficiency within the firm and can, in 
many instances, have a positive impact on firm value, performance and decision-making.1 
  
SAY-ON-PAY 
Theoretical Background 
 
Say-on-Pay studies have so far mainly utilized agency-based theoretical models to build their 
framework and predictions. In modern corporations, the separation between ownership and 
control creates agency problems (Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). For this 
reason, shareholders need specific mechanisms to be in place for monitoring managerial 
behavior and ensuring it is in the company’s interests (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). As part of this monitoring process, shareholders are likely to wish to 
intervene when they believe managerial actions are not in line with the company’s interests 
and would destroy shareholder value (Edmans, 2014). 
 
As mentioned above prior research identifies two channels for shareholder intervention in 
firm governance, namely the threat of “exit” and the use of “voice”. Say-on-Pay provides an 
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additional tool for shareholder governance via the “voice” channel. A number of studies have 
provided models of different strategies that large shareholders can adopt to exert influence 
over governance issues using their “voice”. More particularly, in their theoretical models, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) examine the circumstances under which shareholders, instead of 
choosing to become a free-rider, will incur monitoring costs and use their influence over firm 
decision-making. Depending on the size of the initial stake in the firm, the shareholder can 
intervene in firm decision-making in a number of ways, namely via a tender offer, a proxy 
fight or negotiations with the management. Maug (1998) adds the role of liquidity, which 
gives a higher incentive to a shareholder to hold a large block of stocks and engage in active 
monitoring. Ceteris paribus, greater liquidity decreases the potential profits from frequent 
trading for smaller shareholders who are willing to sell their stocks at a discount, and thus 
encourages blockholding. This finding counters prior studies by Coffee (1991) and Bhide 
(1993), who argue that increased liquidity discourages the use of “voice” as a shareholder 
governance mechanism.  
 
Mangen and Magnan (2012) highlight a potential problem with Say-on-Pay’s role as a voice-
related governance mechanism: Supporters of Say-on-Pay argue that it can embolden 
effective monitoring of firm management by large shareholders and hence promote corporate 
transparency; however, entrenchment problems can potentially lead to the collusion of large 
shareholders with the management team, and thus to blockholder support for suboptimal pay 
arrangements. This can lead to conflicts with other shareholders and firm stakeholders, thus 
increasing agency costs. Moreover, the board of directors might try to avoid significant 
negative reactions and potential dissent from voting shareholders by managing the disclosure 
of compensation plans. This could have a long-term negative impact on the quality of pay-
related disclosure within the firm.  
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By integrating an additional theoretical perspective into their arguments Krause, Whitler, and 
Semadeni (2014) provide a different Say-on-Pay theoretical framework to the prevalent one 
based on agency theory. They use prospect theory to claim that shareholders are more likely 
to vote negatively on high levels of CEO pay when the firm is performing poorly. This is due 
to the fact that decision-makers view profits and losses asymmetrically (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979); hence shareholders are more likely to express their dissent about proposed 
executive pay arrangements when voting from a loss position. The authors confirm their 
arguments in an experimental setting and show that shareholders’ loss aversion can have an 
impact on pay-related voting patterns.  
 
Global Introduction and its Determinants 
 
The UK government was the first, in 2002, to introduce the new legislation that became 
known as the Say-on-Pay initiative (Directors Remuneration Report (DRR) Regulations, 
(2002)). According to this regulation, shareholders should express their approval or 
disapproval of executive pay proposals put forward by the board of directors using a voting 
process. The declared objective of this legislation was to promote corporate governance 
efficiency within the firm and increase the accountability of the board of directors towards its 
shareholders (Ferri & Maber, 2013). The DRR Regulations mandated that, from the fiscal 
year ending on December 31st 2002 onwards, the board of directors must prepare a detailed 
remuneration report and submit it to the Annual General Meeting (AGM) for approval. The 
shareholders are then required to cast non-binding votes on the proposed remuneration 
arrangements; apart from approving or rejecting the remuneration report, shareholders can 
also cast an abstaining vote. The 2013 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act (Department 
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for Business Innovation & Skills, 2013) made Say-on-Pay voting mandatory, rather than 
advisory, thus providing shareholders with the ability to block a proposed executive pay 
package.  
 
Following the UK, and after a series of cases of self-serving behavior by managers, the 
Netherlands introduced a new corporate governance code (Tabaksblat Code) in 2004, which 
included a provision for the introduction of Say-on-Pay voting. The main difference between 
the UK and the Dutch legislation is that in the Dutch legislation the vote is not on the actual 
remuneration report but on the general principles adopted by the board for determining 
executive pay. Also, the vote is binding, not advisory, and only necessary when a board 
recommends changes to these principles. Sweden, Norway and Denmark have adopted 
similar Say-on-Pay provisions as part of their corporate legislation (Thomas & Van der Elst, 
2013). We observe that the frequency and nature of the voting differ across countries. 
Thomas and Van der Elst (2013) attribute these dissimilarities to the degree of concentration 
of ownership, differences in institutional ownership levels, the degree of social tolerance 
towards income inequality, and certain political influences in different countries. Table 1 
provides information on the adoption of Say-on-Pay voting across countries.  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
In a comparative study between the US and the UK on the rules and practices of shareholder 
proposals, Buchanan, Netter, Poulsen, and Yang (2012) show that UK shareholders have 
substantially greater powers than their US counterparts to express their opinions and impose 
changes to firm decision-making. This could explain why the US authorities have recently 
introduced regulation, similar to that of the UK, on advisory shareholder voting on executive 
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pay arrangements as part of the Dodd Frank Act (2010). The regulation was passed despite 
opposing voices from a number of academics and business leaders claiming that Say-on-Pay 
voting can exacerbate rather than resolve agency problems in firms. Bainbridge (2009) 
claimed that the introduction of Say-on-Pay in the US would lead to a “federalization” of 
corporate governance legislation, which could have negative implications for the way the 
capital market operates; also, Say-on-Pay would be a solution to a non-existent problem with 
executive pay, since evidence of excessive managerial power within firms is rather weak. 
Hemphill and Lillevik (2009) claimed that the introduction of Say-on-Pay would constitute a 
major overreach of corporate legislation for reasons not associated with federalism but with 
the fact that, since existing legislation made the board of directors responsible for the pay-
setting process, it already addressed the issue of the determination of executive pay contracts.  
 
Due to activism-related events initiated by several institutional shareholders, a number of 
large Swiss companies agreed to adopt a voluntary Say-on-Pay advisory vote (Wagner & 
Wenk, 2015). However, following a 2013 referendum, which attracted significant attention 
from the media, the Swiss federal government is in the final stages of introducing mandatory 
voting on the election of the board of directors as well as the proposed executive pay 
arrangements. These changes will significantly affect corporate governance arrangements for 
Swiss firms and will lead to a power transfer from the boardroom to the shareholders 
(Nyukorong, 2013). Hausmann and Bechtold-Orth (2013) express concerns that obliging the 
shareholders of Swiss firms to actively monitor and engage with their firms significantly 
increases shareholder responsibility, with important legal consequences.  
 
Finally, following recent developments in a number of countries, there are also proposals in 
the EU to adopt a common policy on the determination of executive pay, including a Say-on-
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Pay vote on proposed executive pay arrangements (European Commission, 2012, 2014). The 
purpose of introducing such a regulation would be to increase shareholder responsibility and 
engagement with the firm. Although the voting process is expected to be mandatory, whether 
the outcome of the voting would have a mandatory or advisory nature is expected to be 
decided by each member state separately (Hausmann & Bechtold-Orth, 2013).  
 
Market Reaction 
 
Since the initial 2002 introduction of Say-on-Pay regulation in the UK, a growing literature 
has emerged focusing on market reactions to this regulatory change across a number of 
settings and taking into account different firm characteristics. Ferri and Maber (2013) report 
positive market reactions on the date of the announcement that the Say-on-Pay regulation 
would be introduced in the UK. This implies that shareholders view this new governance 
mechanism as a positive step towards fairer executive pay. More importantly, the authors find 
higher abnormal returns for firms with excessive CEO pay, generous severance contracts and 
weak penalties for poor performance. This indicates that shareholders consider Say-on-Pay to 
be an effective monitoring mechanism for firms with weak governance.  
 
Cai and Walkling (2011) examine the effect of the introduction of Say-on-Pay on firm value 
in a US setting. Similarly to Ferri and Maber (2013), they find that the introduction creates 
value in firms with weak governance and dubious executive pay arrangements. However, it 
can also destroy value in other firms. More precisely, larger firms are more likely to be 
targeted by shareholder revolts over executive pay even when pay arrangements are not 
considered to be excessive. This indicates that the introduction of mandatory shareholder 
voting on pay might not be beneficial for all firms. The conflicting results of the 
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aforementioned studies can be due to research design issues that we discuss at the end of this 
section.  
 
In the same spirit, Cuñat et al. (2012) document an increase in firm value after the marginal 
approval of a shareholder proposal (including executive-pay-related proposals) that leads to 
improvements in corporate governance. They also show systematic differences in market 
reactions for firms with different ownership characteristics and levels of shareholder 
activism, and for different types of proposals. In a setting that alleviates endogeneity 
concerns, their study highlights the fact that enhancements in corporate governance create 
firm value. 
 
Iliev and Vitanova (2013) examine the impact of the new Say-on-Pay regulation on firm 
value, for US firms, using a quasi-experimental setting. Using the fact that the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) offers firms with a public float lower than $75m the option of 
being exempt from mandatory Say-on-Pay, they demonstrate that these firms exhibited 
negative market returns upon the announcement of the Say-on-Pay regulation. This indicates 
that the mandatory nature of Say-on-Pay is value-relevant and that shareholders wish to vote 
regularly and express their opinions on executive pay proposals.  
 
Wagner and Wenk (2015) examine the impact of the announcement of the introduction of 
binding Say-on-Pay on the value of Swiss firms. Interestingly, they find negative market 
reactions to the announcement for the majority of the firms. This negative reaction is due to 
the additional monitoring costs that the shareholders will bear due to the proposed legislation. 
In effect, such a significant increase in shareholder power might initially sound like a positive 
step towards improved corporate governance but the findings of this paper indicate that the 
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costs linked with a binding Say-on-Pay vote could outweigh any potential benefits from an 
increase in corporate transparency.  
 
Based on the aforementioned studies we observe a number of conflicting findings related to 
Say-on-Pay and shareholders’ perceptions of its usefulness for corporate governance. There 
is some evidence that Say-on-Pay introduction is perceived as beneficial, to a degree, for 
firms with weak governance structures and suboptimal executive pay arrangements in place. 
However, we observe systematic differences across different settings relatively to the size 
and direction of the market reaction to the announcement of the introduction of Say-on-Pay 
for different types of firms.  
 
We believe that this can be due to a number of reasons. First, several of the above studies fail 
to incorporate a number of factors that could affect market reactions to Say-on-Pay, such as 
shareholder heterogeneity. Different types of shareholders have dissimilar firm-related 
incentives; hence the observed market reaction to Say-on-Pay introduction can be driven by 
shareholders’ self-serving behavior and should not be considered as a signal of the usefulness 
of Say-on-Pay for corporate governance and shareholder empowerment. For example, we 
cannot exclude the possibility that the observed findings are driven by confounding effects, 
related to free-riding behavior by a number of investors who do not engage with the firm but 
expect to benefit from the Say-on-Pay-related monitoring activities of other shareholders. 
This is particularly relevant in this type of studies, as prior research has shown systematic 
differences in institutional ownership characteristics across different countries (Ferreira & 
Matos, 2008). Second, at a country level, there are differences in the “perceived value” of 
corporate governance (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000), so 
comparisons of market reactions between different environments may not be informative. 
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Moreover, the well-documented cultural differences across countries regarding executive pay 
and its importance for corporate governance (Conyon & Murphy, 2000) can also impact on 
market reactions in relation to Say-on-Pay. Finally, institutional inertia, resistance or push for 
corporate governance-related improvements can act as moderators to market reactions to the 
introduction of Say-on-Pay and significantly affect the findings of the above studies.  
 
Outcomes 
 Mandatory Voting on Pay.  
In addition to the impact of the introduction of Say-on-Pay on firm value, a large number of 
studies examine the effect of outcomes of mandatory voting on the level and structure of 
executive pay and on overall firm decision-making. Alissa (2015) finds evidence that, in the 
UK, shareholder voting dissent increases with excessive executive pay. This implies that 
shareholders express their dissatisfaction with excessive pay practices through voting. Firms 
also respond to shareholder dissent by reducing excessive CEO pay practices or forcing the 
CEO out of office. The former happens only for firms with above-mean excessive 
compensation. These findings suggest that company boards seem to respond to shareholder 
dissatisfaction by adjusting, to a certain degree, their decisions.   
 
Carter and Zamora (2009) examine which specific aspects of executive pay arrangements 
attract shareholder voting dissent. The study shows that negative voting is positively 
associated with high salaries, low pay-performance sensitivity for short-term bonus payments 
and a high likelihood of dilution of equity-based pay. These findings suggest that 
shareholders are more likely to vote against executive pay arrangements associated with 
excessive pay. In line with Alissa (2015), boards try to respond to this dissatisfaction by 
making adjustments to suboptimal arrangements. Both of the above studies indicate that Say-
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on-Pay can act as an effective means of improvement of executive pay arrangements; 
however, they do not make any attempt to examine the underlying drivers of shareholder 
voting on pay or to explain the observed low levels of voting dissent.  
 
Gregory-Smith, Thompson, and Wright (2014) report a positive association between negative 
voting and total pay levels for a large sample of UK firms over the period 2003 to 2012. 
There are also moderate changes in executive pay arrangements, but only in cases with high 
percentages of negative voting. Interestingly, these changes do not become more pronounced 
in the period following the 2007/08 financial crisis despite the expectation that Say-on-Pay 
voting would provide a straightforward avenue for shareholders to express dissatisfaction 
with losses suffered during that period. This finding contradicts prior studies on the role of 
Say-on-Pay as a channel of expression of shareholder dissatisfaction(Alissa, 2015; Carter & 
Zamora, 2009).  
 
Ferri and Maber (2013) focus on UK firms with high percentages of voter dissent (higher 
than 20%) and examine board reactions to this strong shareholder dissatisfaction. These firms 
make significant changes to generous severance arrangements, remove or shorten the time 
period allowed for retesting the vesting provisions of equity-based pay, and increase pay-for-
performance sensitivity for CEO pay. This implies that shareholders view Say-on-Pay as an 
effective way of expressing their dissatisfaction with ineffective pay arrangements and use it 
to push for their removal. Overall, the findings of this study suggest that high voter dissent 
can eventually lead to the removal of controversial CEO pay practices.  
 
In contrast, Conyon and Sadler (2010) find limited evidence that a large amount of dissent 
among voting shareholders has any material impact on the subsequent level and structure of 
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CEO pay for UK firms. They also find no significant changes in the structure of executive 
compensation following high levels of negative voting; in particular, there is no move 
towards higher proportions of performance-related, e.g. equity-based, pay. However, 
executive pay-related resolutions are more likely to attract negative voting from shareholders 
than other forms of resolution submitted for voting. This is consistent with the view that 
shareholders consider executive pay arrangements of great importance for firm value and an 
avenue for expressing their dissatisfaction with management decisions, since cases of high 
pay attract the highest levels of voter dissent. As we discuss later, we believe that the 
contrasting findings of these studies can be explained by further examining the dynamic 
nature of shareholder voting and its underlying drivers.  
 
Cotter, Palmiter, and Thomas (2013) provide one of the first studies to examine voting 
patterns and the impact of the introduction of mandatory Say-on-Pay voting in the US on 
executive pay practices. The study identifies a positive relation between shareholder voting 
dissent and excessive pay practices, poor performance and negative recommendations from 
proxy advisors. Interestingly, proxy advisors’ recommendations have the greatest explanatory 
power for negative voting; hence, their role in this process requires further attention. Overall, 
they find that the introduction of mandatory voting on pay does not instigate a shareholder 
revolt against pay proposals, as some parties have suggested. In addition, they identify a 
positive impact on company management’s responsiveness to shareholders’ concerns about 
executive pay, especially in firms with excessive pay arrangements in place.  
 
 Voluntary Voting on Pay. 2  
In the US setting, a number of studies have examined the impact of voluntary shareholder 
voting proposals before its recent introduction as a mandatory corporate governance 
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mechanism through the Dodd Frank Act. Ertimur et al. (2011) focus on US-based shareholder 
activism events related to pay. In particular, they examine cases of shareholder proposals and 
“vote no” campaigns directed against controversial executive pay arrangements. Activist 
shareholders target firms with high levels of CEO pay, regardless of whether these levels are 
considered excessive or not. Also, proposals aimed mainly at the pay-setting process are most 
likely to receive high levels of support. Meanwhile, those aimed at the design and structure of 
the pay package seem to receive less support. Overall, Ertimur et al. (2011) find that 
shareholder proposals are more effective in cases where the companies have excessive pay 
arrangements in place. These firms respond to shareholder dissatisfaction by significantly 
reducing the excessive levels of CEO compensation (by more than 35% on average).  
 
Del Guercio et al. (2008) examine the “just vote no” form of shareholder activism. The 
organizers of these campaigns are typically activist shareholders trying to achieve a public 
vote of no confidence in one or more of the directors. A large number of them are driven by 
cases of excessive pay not associated with firm performance; hence, they are indirectly linked 
to Say-on-Pay voting. The study shows an increase in operating performance following the 
activism-related events and reports a positive association between these campaigns and CEO 
turnover decisions; the expression of shareholder dissatisfaction forces boards to take actions 
that protect shareholders’ interests.  
 
Burns and Minnick (2013) examine the specific impact of voluntary Say-on-Pay proposals on 
executive pay arrangements in the US. They report insignificant differences in the total level 
of CEO pay between firms that receive Say-on-Pay proposals and those that do not. 
However, they report a change in executive pay structure towards a higher proportion of 
incentive-based compensation compared to salary-based for firms that receive proposals. This 
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increase is achieved through greater option-based pay, which also leads to an increase in pay-
for-performance sensitivity. Interestingly, firms with high levels of cash-based CEO pay are 
more likely to receive Say-on-Pay proposals from their shareholders.  
 
In contrast, a recent study by Armstrong, Gow, and Larcker (2013) provides little evidence 
that shareholder dissent leads to changes in the level or composition of incentive-based CEO 
pay for US firms. They find that, in firms where a compensation plan is rejected by 
shareholders, the shareholders are more likely to approve the plan in the succeeding year. The 
findings of this study suggest a weak effect of shareholder dissatisfaction, expressed through 
negative voting, on future CEO compensation arrangements. For this reason any potential 
increase in shareholder power provided by mandatory Say-on-Pay voting will not have the 
anticipated outcomes on the pay-setting process.  
 
Iliev and Vitanova (2013) find that the voluntary adoption of Say-on-Pay voting by firms has 
led to an increase in the overall levels of CEO pay and pay-for-performance sensitivity. They 
claim that higher pay is used by boards as a way of compensating managers for the higher 
sensitivity of pay to performance and the higher risk that a Say-on-Pay vote entails. 
Moreover, the directors of companies that voluntarily adopt Say-on-Pay receive greater 
support in the shareholder vote. Overall, the majority of the companies in their study had not 
attempted to avoid implementing the new regulation, and had decided to submit executive 
pay voting proposals; in other words, the boards of directors had shared the responsibility for 
the executive pay-setting process with the company shareholders.  
 
Our above analysis suggests that evidence is still inconclusive as to whether Say-on-Pay is an 
effective channel for the expression of shareholder voice leading to improvements in 
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corporate governance. There is conflicting evidence on the effect of voting results on future 
executive pay arrangements, CEO employment and corporate policies in general. Also, 
research so far has not provided a plausible explanation for the observed low levels of 
shareholder voting dissent on executive pay discussed in the following section.  
 
We suggest a number of explanations for this. First, the existing research fails to incorporate 
the dynamic nature and the underlying drivers of Say-on-Pay voting. The role of 
intermediaries, such as proxy advisors, and also the importance of shareholder heterogeneity 
and of conflicts of interest between different firm stakeholders in this process are all factors 
that could explain prior conflicting evidence on the impact of Say-on-Pay voting outcomes on 
firm decision-making. As we analyze in the following section, these are all factors that future 
studies could incorporate to help us further understand the Say-on-Pay voting process. 
Second, selection bias issues can be prevalent in a number of studies, especially in the cases 
of the adoption of voluntary voting on executive pay. Since firms choose to solicit 
shareholder voting on an ad-hoc basis, the above studies can only observe the specific 
proposals submitted for voting; hence the firm’s choice to request a vote on pay can be a 
source of self-selection bias for the findings of these studies. It is still unclear whether this 
choice is a sign of efficient corporate governance structures within the firm or whether it can 
be due to other reasons, such as managerial entrenchment. Therefore, the ways that in such a 
setting shareholders choose to cast their votes or generally engage with Say on Pay need 
further analysis.  
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SUGGESTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The previous sections provide an overview of the theories underpinning Say-on-Pay research, 
empirical evidence on the impact of the introduction of Say-on-Pay on firm value and the 
effect of voting results on corporate outcomes. The purpose of this section is to discuss the 
theoretical and empirical implications of prior Say-on-Pay related research and suggest 
potential avenues for future research at a theoretical and empirical level. At a theoretical level 
we suggest a number of potential developments of the existing Say-on-Pay framework. At an 
empirical level, we argue there is scope for extending existing Say-on-Pay related research on 
what we call its “intended” consequences on firm value and corporate governance. We also 
contend that the “unintended” consequences of Say-on-Pay remain under-explored and can 
provide fruitful avenues for future research.  
 
Theoretical advances  
As mentioned previously, at a theoretical level, the majority of the extant literature takes an 
agency theory perspective in explaining Say-on-Pay related phenomena. Evidently, there is 
merit in viewing voting on pay as a monitoring mechanism available to shareholders, as part 
of a principal-agent relationship. However, in taking this perspective the researcher implicitly 
assumes homogeneity across shareholders, in terms of their interests, their expectations from 
the firm, and their characteristics. Mangen and Magnan (2012) make an initial attempt to 
highlight the underlying heterogeneity issue; for various reasons large shareholders have a 
different relationship with the firm and their voting behavior can be driven by dissimilar 
determinants compared with smaller owners. Krause’s (2014) study is a first and promising 
attempt to use a different theoretical framework (i.e. prospect theory) in this context; diverse 
shareholder characteristics (loss aversion in this case) can explain their, puzzling in many 
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instances, voting behavior when it comes to executive pay. Further research building on these 
studies seems well warranted.  
  
Following the shareholder activism literature, the application of stakeholder theory to Say-
on-Pay could also be a fruitful avenue for future research. Stakeholder theory highlights the 
importance of the interrelationships between the firm and a number of parties such as its 
employees, creditors, customers and shareholders (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 
1984). Importantly for our context, company actions that benefit shareholders but harm 
stakeholders in the short run might also prove to be harmful to shareholders in the long run 
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, Wicks, & Parmar, 2004). Therefore, the use of 
stakeholder theory in explaining Say-on-Pay voting patterns could help researchers to further 
delineate shareholder decisions. In effect, the anticipated divergent impacts of a specific 
voting proposal on different groups of stakeholders could affect shareholder voting behavior. 
It is thus plausible that some shareholders do not appreciate (or are not interested in) the 
impact of their short-termism on the long-term value of the firm. This can create frictions 
between stakeholders and can impact on the way that other shareholders cast their vote. Any 
empirical findings confirming the above predictions could have wider implications for 
corporate governance and the executive pay-setting process.  
 
Intended Consequences 
At an empirical level, our previous discussion highlights a number of issues associated with 
Say-on-Pay that remain unanswered and could be further explored. First, it is fairly evident 
that the extant literature is primarily oriented towards the Anglo-Saxon setting. We believe 
that this is mainly due to the fact that the UK in particular provides an ideal setting for 
archival research on Say-on-Pay as investors in the UK have been required by law to submit 
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non-binding votes on executive pay since 2002. Therefore, there is no selection bias in the 
voting decision, which until recently was a major problem in other settings. However, given 
the institutional changes discussed earlier there is now great scope for expanding the Say-on-
Pay analysis to the international domain.  
 
Correa and Lel (2014) is, to our knowledge, one of the first papers to attempt this and it 
shows significant changes in executive pay practices for countries that have introduced Say-
on-Pay provisions compared to countries without such provisions in place; however, the data 
used are limited in terms of details on voting decisions. Additional cross-country studies 
would greatly enhance both our understanding of corporate governance mechanisms and the 
role of regulation in enhancing their effectiveness. Such studies could focus, for example, on 
cross-country differences in Say-on-Pay’s efficiency in promoting corporate transparency. 
This could provide an important contribution to the literature since our previous analysis 
demonstrates that the existing UK and US evidence is inconclusive as to the effectiveness of 
Say-on-Pay for improving transparency in the executive pay-setting process. It would also be 
interesting to examine whether differences in effectiveness can be associated with 
dissimilarities in terms of the mandatory or advisory nature of the vote. The adoption process 
of Say-on-Pay across different countries also offers opportunities for research on the 
institutional mechanisms leading to the decision to introduce, or not introduce, such 
legislation. 
 
Second, specific empirical findings from prior studies also open channels for further research 
on the topic. A common element across all studies focusing on Say-on-Pay voting patterns in 
the UK is the reported relatively low degree of shareholder dissent. For example, Carter & 
Zamora (2009) find that negative votes comprise much less than 10% of the total votes cast; 
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in 2005, the share was only 3.4%. It is still unclear whether the observed low levels of voting 
dissent are due to efficient monitoring, entrenchment issues or other firm-related 
determinants. We believe there is room for further research incorporating additional firm, 
country and shareholder characteristics to inform this debate. For example, cultural attributes 
could be a plausible explanation for this type of voting pattern. It would also be interesting to 
examine systematic differences in the voting decision by taking into account shareholder 
heterogeneity.  
 
Stathopoulos and Voulgaris (2015) make a first such attempt by exploring the impact of 
shareholder characteristics on their voting behavior associated with Say-on-Pay and find 
evidence that the shareholder investment horizon is an important determinant of voting 
patterns. Short-term investors, who are expected to try to avoid incurring any monitoring 
costs linked with Say-on-Pay, are more likely to cast an abstaining vote and will only express 
dissent in the case of excessive (and hence easily identifiable) CEO pay. On the other hand, 
long-term investors predominantly cast a favorable vote, a behavior that appears to be 
associated with prior engagement, as opposed to collusion, with the management of the firm. 
Future studies could explore this issue further to better explain the dynamics of the Say-on-
Pay voting process. For instance, it is plausible to expect different voting determinants and 
patterns for pension funds compared to hedge funds. The role of retail investors in the voting 
process could be another interesting line of research.  
 
Additional analysis on the role of potential forces of resistance against the introduction of 
Say-on-Pay could provide us with further insights on the adoption process and its impact on 
firm value and corporate governance arrangements. Resistance of managers or other firm 
stakeholders, such as investors or debtholders, to corporate governance reforms are well-
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documented in the corporate governance literature (Denis & McConnell, 2003). Therefore, it 
is highly likely that such institutional impediments are also relevant to Say-on-Pay adoption 
and effectiveness. We thus encourage further research on the underlying causes of such 
resistance and its consequences for Say-on-Pay voting outcomes and firm values.  
 
The role of intermediaries, such as proxy advisors, on the Say-on-Pay process also bears 
further analysis, to help explain some of the conflicting findings of prior studies. In 
particular, it would be interesting to investigate whether proxy advisors have a mind of their 
own or simply act as information processors/intermediaries for their end users, that is, firm 
shareholders and investors at large. Ertimur et al. (2013) make a first attempt, but we believe 
that selection bias issues related to the voluntary adoption of Say-on-Pay in the US prior to 
the Dodd-Frank Act could have an impact on the interpretation of the findings of this study.  
 
Our review further highlights that there is scope for more research focusing on market 
reactions and on changes in the portfolio positions of existing shareholders after specific 
voting outcomes. As discussed earlier, studies have so far focused mainly on market reactions 
to announcements of the introduction of Say-on-Pay initiatives. Hence, it would be 
interesting to examine changes in firm value after specific voting outcomes, e.g. an extremely 
high level of dissent or even the unanimous acceptance of a proposal. It would also be 
interesting to study any systematic differences in changes of portfolio positions across 
different types of existing shareholders after such voting results. The position of Say-on-Pay 
voting within the overall corporate governance framework of the firm, and its interaction 
with other governance mechanisms (e.g., managerial ownership, board independence), could 
be another fruitful avenue of research. Also, specific CEO characteristics associated with the 
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CEO’s “power” (or entrenchment) within the firm which could drive shareholder voting 
behavior remain largely unexplored.  
 
Finally, the fact that Say-on-Pay voting has now been adopted by a large number of countries 
also offers potentially interesting settings for comparative studies adopting both a 
quantitative/archival and qualitative/critical approach. In particular, our analysis points out 
the interdisciplinary nature of the existing research relating to the Say-on-Pay initiative. 
However, we believe that a multidisciplinary approach to the topic is currently lacking. 
Including surveys or interviews with key players in the pay-setting process could open up 
different possibilities to the researcher and give conclusive answers to questions that archival 
research alone has so far failed to provide. This could also be combined with our previous 
suggestions on incorporating the impacts of shareholder heterogeneity, management team 
characteristics and cultural attributes on the voting process.  
 
Unintended Consequences 
An important finding of our review is the lack of studies focusing on the unintended 
consequences of Say-on-Pay. Given the potential impact of shareholder voting dissent on 
managerial human capital, we encourage new studies on the impact of the Say-on-Pay 
introduction on the managerial labor market. Firms with a history of shareholder revolts over 
executive pay issues might have problems attracting managerial talent. At the same time 
managers and other board members whose proposals have repeatedly received negative votes 
could find it difficult to secure lucrative employment contracts in other companies. What is 
more, Say-on-Pay adoption can seriously affect CEO risk-taking, with wider implications for 
the structure of executive pay contracts and for firm decision making in general. For instance, 
it is reasonable to expect that a number of firms could consider transferring their headquarters 
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to countries that have not introduced mandatory Say-on-Pay voting as a protective measure 
against potential shareholder revolts.  
 
Future research could also analyze the interaction of Say-on-Pay with debtholder monitoring 
activities and its impact on agency costs of debt. Although Say-on-Pay and shareholder 
activism could reduce agency costs of equity, there are no studies so far examining Say-on-
Pay’s impact on the agency costs of debt. It is reasonable to expect that any changes in 
executive pay structure to induce CEO risk-taking due to Say-on-Pay adoption could lead to 
an increase in agency costs of debt. Finally, it still remains unclear whether external 
corporate governance mechanisms, such as bank monitoring, act as a substitute to Say-on-
Pay and thus moderate shareholder voting dissent.  
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
Our review is informative for regulators regarding the current status of academic research on 
the effectiveness of Say-on-Pay in improving shareholder engagement and promoting 
corporate governance transparency. This is of particular importance across EU countries, 
including the UK, due to the recent proposals for new Say-on-Pay related legislation 
(European Commission, 2012, 2014). Our study highlights that, despite the indications that 
Say-on-Pay has a moderating impact on cases of suboptimal executive pay arrangements, 
evidence on its effectiveness remains unclear. Therefore, the proposed further advancement 
of its role in the pay-setting process should not be considered as a panacea for all corporate 
problems associated with excessive pay. More thought is needed regarding the dynamics of 
shareholder incentives in relation to Say-on-Pay and the wisdom of changing the nature of 
the vote from advisory to mandatory. Moreover, we believe that, along with Say-on-Pay, 
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there is scope for additional means of promoting shareholder engagement that will help to 
further enhance corporate transparency. Our study could also be useful for the media and the 
general public since it summarizes current knowledge on this “sensitive” issue and in effect 
tries to engage the public with relatively less known aspects of this interesting topic.  
 
To conclude, increasing shareholder empowerment and the associated upsurge in the number 
of public shareholder activism events have, on many occasions, become a force for 
institutional change within firms. This study focuses on an important channel for the 
expression of shareholder voice, a corporate governance mechanism known as Say-on-Pay. 
Our review and analysis of the relevant literature indicates that Say-on-Pay has been the 
focus of attention for researchers from a number of social science disciplines but that 
discrepancies, gaps and inconsistencies across the relevant literature remain. We show that 
there is scope for extensive further research on Say-on-Pay and identify a number of 
unanswered questions and potentially fruitful avenues for future studies to explore.  
 
                                                        
1 Apart from the right to vote on executive pay related proposals, shareholders in some countries are also 
required to express their opinion on a number of company-related issues through a voting process. Yermack 
(2010) provides a detailed review of shareholder voting and its impact on corporate governance arrangements 
within the firm. Prior studies have focused on the election (or re-election) of the board of directors (Fischer, 
Gramlich, Miller, & White, 2009; Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999), the approval of new mergers & acquisitions 
(Kalay, Karakas, & Pant, 2014) and the mechanics behind the voting process (Kahan & Rock, 2008). As 
mentioned earlier, a number of shareholder activism events are associated with voting (Del Guercio et al., 2008; 
Greenwood & Schor, 2009; Klein & Zur, 2011). Overall, research in this area indicates the increasing 
importance both shareholders and firms place on voting. This can be linked to a shift towards democratization 
within the firm and also to some sharing of responsibility between the shareholders and management for firm 
decision-making. It may also explain the increased interest in Say-on-Pay voting and its gradual introduction in 
a number of countries, as we analyze in detail in our review. 
2 Strictly speaking, this type of voting is not a Say-on-Pay case as presented in the previous sections, since it 
does not refer to mandatory voting. However, we believe it shares many common characteristics with Say-on-
Pay and hence its impact on firm outcomes is worth investigating.  
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Table 1 
Say-on-Pay Adoption by country 
Country Adoption Year Type of Firms Type of Vote Other Information 
Australia 2005 Listed Mandatory & Advisory Boards are required to explain their response to 
voting dissent higher than 25%. There is also a "two-
strike" clause, where the board has to stand for 
reelection if dissent is higher than 25% for two 
consecutive years.  
Belgium 2012 Listed Mandatory & Advisory  
Canada 2012 Listed Voluntary & Advisory Companies have the option to ask for an advisory 
vote on the remuneration package and policy  
Denmark 2007 Listed Mandatory & Binding  
Finland 2007 Listed Mandatory & Binding  
France 2014 Listed Mandatory & Advisory  
Germany 2010 Listed Voluntary & Advisory Proposals for a binding vote were rejected by the 
German parliament in 2013 
Italy 2011 Listed & Banks Mandatory & Advisory 
(Binding for Banks) 
 
Japan 2005 Listed Mandatory & Binding  
Netherlands 2004 Listed Mandatory & Binding Voting is required only when there are changes in the 
remuneration policy 
Norway 2007 Listed Mandatory & Binding  
South Africa 2009 Listed Mandatory & Advisory  
Spain 2011 Listed Mandatory & Advisory  
Sweden 2005 Listed Mandatory & Binding  
Switzerland 2007 Listed Mandatory & Binding Switzerland introduced voluntary & advisory Say-on- 
Pay regulation in 2007. Following a referendum in 
2013, the nature of the vote changed in 2015 
UK 2002 Listed Mandatory & Binding The nature of the vote was mandatory & advisory 
until October 2013 
USA 2011 Listed Mandatory & Advisory Introduced as part of the Dodd-Frank Act 
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